Defying the masses and their charmers

Majority truths and social lies

The world's a stage: would-be actors and political beasts concoct the most elaborate stories in order to oppose truth and right—in the name of common interest, of course! Meanwhile, the "compact majorities" are kept entertained by various arts of stagecraft, never confronted with harsh reality.

Quite a statement, indeed. A realistic one! So the masses are doomed to stay ignorant by charmers and ingenious conversationalists?

What if this isn't always the case? Aristotle, in his Politics, Book 3, deals with the question of the sovereign power in the city-state; and his way of argumentation in favor of the multitude or the many is quite interesting: 

"For it is possible that the many, though not individually good men, yet when they come together may be better, not individually but collectively."^[1]

The soundness of judgement of individuals assembled together seems to be proportional to their number: 

"[…] for where there are many, each individual, it may be argued, has some portion of virtue and wisdom, and when they have come together, just as the multitude becomes a single man with many feet and many hands and many senses, so also it becomes one personality as regards the moral and intellectual faculties."^[2]

Can this collective wisdom judge adequately on matters political and moral? Usually, we don't trust the volatile masses—we, the obviously logicians and philosophical critics. Besides, "ordinary" people are mostly keen on securing their daily bread, instead of fighting for bright ideals. Maybe the masses know very well what's in their best interest, and that's the knotty part. 

Here's what I mean: in Ibsen's theatrical play An Enemy of the People the multitude is scolded for its adherence to falsehood and deceit. In fact, the people recognize what's good for their community, but this is where the controversy begins: Stockmann, the main protagonist, sees his fellow citizens ready to build their town's prosperity on barefaced, damaging deceptions.

At the core of this position, as per Stockmann, lie certain crowd-pleasing beliefs he dubs "social lies": old and rotten dressed-as-truth illusions that harm societies internally. Let's see two popular examples mentioned in the play:

•  "the majority has always right on its side"

• "the common folk have the same right to govern as the virtuous and excellent individuals".
  

What became of Aristotle's argument then? Can it be that the many are indeed able to govern themselves and perceive what advances their welfare, yet only to build this well-being upon self-pleasing illusions?

And what's the role of those "hyper-virtuous" individuals? For Ibsen, only this avant-garde type of free-spirits can stand out against the self-deceiving masses and their ideologues (e.g. would-be-politicians, the press). Fresh ideas require broad-mindedness, passion and openness towards the world. Wise is the person "who stands most alone", steering clear of public opinion and its social lies—in the likes of Heraclitus and Nietzsche perhaps.

 

Caspar David Friedrich, The Monk by the Sea (Der Mönch am Meer), before restoration.

 

[1] Aristotle, Politics, Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944, 1281a-1281b. Find the excerpt in Perseus. 

[2] Ibid., 1281b. 

Truth and common interest at odds?

Individuality contra society

There are times when we feel disposed to defend what's right and truth in spite of the majority. After all, what would become of the public welfare without any Socratic gadflies? Nevertheless, home truths may push whole societies beyond their "comfort zone" and compromise their—sometimes blameworthy—prosperity.

Then again, what good can truth or new ideas bring? Perhaps the public benefits most from the old, established ideas it already has. Rousseau^[1] and Hegel^[2] have claimed that the people do not always understand what's in their own best interest. And what if the prevailing conception of common good clashes with right and truth..? 

For example, in Henrik Ibsen's 1882 theatrical play "An enemy of the people" (original title: En folkefiende) the main protagonist, Dr. Thomas Stockmann, strives for right and truth, while firmly opposing widespread beliefs regarding the place of individuals in society and the value of "majority truths".

Stockmann—a man of science—discovers that the water of the municipal baths, which are the only source of economic growth for the local community, is contaminated and thus dangerous to use. He feels committed to informing his fellow-citizens in order to protect his town and any potential visitors to the baths from harm. Conversely, Stockmann's older brother, who serves as the town's mayor and the chairman of the baths' committee, vehemently disagrees with this idea: such a revelation would be economically and socially devastating.

The relationship between science, society, politics and power is truly a knotty one. Who's the real friend of the people and who's his enemy? Is it the one who wants to warn his fellow citizens by exposing the truth, or the one who prefers a cautious approach intending to safeguard the community from economic collapse?   

We should ponder on this contrast, because societies are largely characterized by such conflicting perspectives. The fiery and misarchist Stockmann wants to fight the lies that pervade society—the poisoned waters of the baths symbolize the falsities on which the town's flourishing depends—and scorns the mayor for wanting to cover up the truth. On the other hand, the mayor wants to minimize the likely enormous financial, social and, in the end, political costs of anyone involved—his own reputation is deeply intertwined with the common good.

Whereas practical politics are usually devoid of moral considerations and may involve hypocrisy and deception, individual conscience can be rebellious and uncompromising. Hegel remarks that the tendency to look inwards and decide from within oneself what is right and good "appears in epochs when what is recognized as right and good in actuality and custom is unable to satisfy the better will"^[3]. That is, Stockmann revolts against the status quo, because his sense of judgement denounces what is recognized by the authorities as right and good—i.e., the interest of the public based on fraud and trickery—as null and void. 

Cover page of the original manuscript, 1882.

---

[1] J-J. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social (1762), Flammarion, Paris, 2001, II, VI, p. 74.

[2] G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1970, § 301, p. 469.

[3] G.W.F. Hegel, Ibid., § 138, p. 259; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 167