Subjectivity and vanity in Hegel's philosophy (Part 3)

The sole determining factor

From what we've seen so far in Hegel's account of conscience, there is a certain amount of contingency as to what is to be recognized as good by subjective conscience. All the same, the good is supposed to be something universal, in which such contingency and formality—or emptiness—vanish.[1] As for the evaluation of an action regarding legal imputation, public laws and universal customs (die allgemeinen Sitten) constitute the only guiding principles.[2]

What is duty?

Nevertheless, these determinations are, at this point of the argumentation, absent—we are still observing the “merely moral point of view”[3]. The good itself may be regarded as an obligation (Verpflichtung) in relation to the subjective will,[4] but an exact account of what is to be considered as duty (Pflicht) has yet to emerge;[5] Hegel argues that particular determinations such as right and welfare are too restricting, and thus considerations regarding duty are directed “to the higher sphere of the unconditional”[6].  

Banishing hot air

Insofar as the good remains abstract and groundless, then “the absolute inward certainty of itself”[7]—or conscience—remains the sole determining factor or absolute authority regarding the particular content of the good, and hence of duty. Yet, empty talk about duty, the unconditional or universality makes us weary of its abstraction and incites us to search for its determinate content.[8] What happens in absence of such content?

The noble standpoint

Then a…content creator emerges: subjectivity, which is hence directed toward the “deepest inward loneliness with itself”[9]. This direction signifies a noble standpoint (hohe Standpunkt), since the subject can unbind itself from any particular ends.[10] Hegel even attributes to it a certain degree of majesty, inasmuch as it demonstrates and raises itself above finitude.[11] However, this detachment from particularity leads the self-relating subject to connect her inner cognizance of itself as thinking (Denken) with what should count as moraly obligatory for the will.[12]

Succinctly put: “[B]efore conscience nothing counts as right and duty, no existence is valid”[13]. 

Franz Marc, Der Tiger, 1912

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[1] See Hegel, Die „Rechtsphilosophie“ von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen 1821–1825, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1974, § 132, 471.

[2] See Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Werke vol. 7, E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel (eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, § 132 Anmerkung, 246; Elements, 159–160.

[3] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 135 Anmerkung, 252; Elements, 162.

[4] See Hegel, Grundlinien, § 133, 250; Elements, 161.

[5] See Hegel, Grundlinien, § 134, 251; Elements, 161.

[6] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 135, 252; Elements, 162.

[7] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 136, 254; Elements, 163.

[8] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H. G. Hotho 1822/23, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1974, § 136, 425.

[9] Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 136, 426.

[10] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 136, 426.

[11] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 138, 432.

[12] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 136, 426–427.

[13] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817/18) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19), Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1983, § 66 Anmerkung, 86–87.