True and formal conscience
A certain difference between subjective cognizance of the value of an action and objectivity has been made apparent in Hegel's account of morality, and develops further as follows:
- When conscience acts according to
objective determinations and obligations—which only ethical life (Sittlichkeit) can provide to subjective
knowledge—it is thus called true conscience (wahrhaftes Gewissen). True conscience consists in “the disposition
to will what is good in and for itself”[1] and acts
according to objective duties,[2] insofar as it
relinquishes the possibility of determining the particular content of the
good itself.[3]
- If the actions of conscience do not conform to any fixed principles (feste Grundsätze), conscience retains only “the formal aspect of the activity of the will”[4]. Within the standpoint of morality the only available content for conscience to adopt appears to be “the infinite formal certainty of itself”[5].
Universality contra self-certainty
Obviously, this content may or may not be in accordance with what is “truly right and duty”[6]. As Hegel mentions, “rationality in and for itself”[7] is not to be treated as equivalent to what a certain individual holds to be right and true; in fact, the content of this supposed good (Gutseinsollenden) must be compared with “universal determinations of thought” that take “the form of laws and principles”[8].
On the contrary, formal conscience improperly presumes that its self-certainty and inwardness constitute the only guiding principle to determine the good and evaluate its actions—as if such an arbitrary positing of the good were isolated from objective determinations.[9] Of course, this once more indicates a stance of total divergence of the subject from what is acknowledged as objectively and universally valid.
The limits of moral standpoint
To the degree that conscience holds fast to this one-sided (moral) standpoint, the state cannot recognize it as valid “any more than science can grant any validity to subjective opinion, assertion and the appeal to subjective opinion”[10]. Conscience is entitled to know what the good in and for itself is, and thus to acknowledge as obligatory only what it cognizes as the good, provided that this cognizance aligns with what is truly right and rational—this takes the form of universal determinations based on thought. But conscience is not entitled to posit itself the content of the good, unless it clings on to its self-certainty and subjective opinion.[11]
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| Franz Marc - Kämpfende Formen, 1914 |
[1] Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Werke vol. 7, E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel (eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp § 137, 254; Elements, 164.
[2] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817/18) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19), § 66 Anmerkung, 87. Cf. Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H. G. Hotho 1822/23, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1974, § 137, 427–428.
[3] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts (1821/22), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2005, § 137, 133.
[4] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137, 254; Elements, 164.
[5] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137, 255; Elements, 164.
[6] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137 Anmerkung, 255; Elements, 164.
[7] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137 Anmerkung, 255; Elements, 164.
[8] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137 Anmerkung, 255; Elements, 164–165. Cf. Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von K. G. v. Griesheims 1824/25 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1974), § 137, 362.
[9] See Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 137, 132.
[10] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137 Anmerkung, 255; Elements, 165.
[11] See Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137 Anmerkung, 256; Elements, 165. Cf. Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 132, 129–130.
