Moral agency and the notion of the good
In his prefatory remarks of Rechtsphilosophie, Hegel scorns subjective considerations based on mere convictions or feelings and associates them with vanity (Eitelkeit); vanity displays unjustified claims on the part of subjectivity, which purports to possess a spirit of superior knowledge in relation to the present (Gegenwart). When a philosophy attempts to spring over its time, thus constructing a world as it ought to be, the theories produced through such an undertaking would exist only in the pretentious endeavors of opinion—“a pliant medium in which the imagination can construct anything it pleases”.[1] Hegel’s counter-argument is well known: the sole purpose of his treatise is “to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity”.[2]
Inwardness and objectivity
With this in mind, I will attempt to inquire into Hegel’s accounts of vanity in the chapter on “Morality". This could contribute to the understanding of his more general—and by all means philosophical—stance as expressed in the preface of Rechtsphilosophie; it is where vanity relates to a widespread attitude of his time – namely, the hostility towards what is publicly and universally valid.
In the case of the preface, the critique of vanity concerns, more generally, the faultfinding that inwardness (Innerlichkeit) and opinion (Meinen) adopt towards what is universally and objectively valid as well as a tendency to deviate “from what is universally acknowledged and valid”.[3] I believe that an analogous line of argumentation can be identified in the context of Hegel’s critical examination of abstract morality, and particularly in his discussion of conscience (Gewissen).
Henceforth, and in the next parts of this analysis, I will argue for such a link, first by presenting what conscience is and then by explicating subjective vanity and its, in a way, overly critical stance in reference to objectivity.
A new aspect of morality
In the second part of Rechtsphilosophie, entitled “Morality” (Moralität), vanity appears as a consequence of the limited and abstract standpoint of subjective conscience regarding what is right or wrong, legal or illegal. During the explication of subjective freedom seen as satisfaction of particular interests, the argumentation reaches a turning point, where cases of extreme danger and necessity (Not) give rise to a conflict between one-sided approaches: on the one hand, the rigorous implementation of the law, and on the other, the right to personal welfare, both of which appear equally justified.
The solution to this opposition constitutes a new aspect of morality, the good (das Gute), which unifies abstract right with the subjective will; thus, the particular aims of subjectivity are legitimized through the good. In fact, both (abstract) right and welfare are “moments of the good”,[4] and the aforementioned one-sided viewpoints are superseded, as the particular (das Besondere) retains its right within the universal.
It's important to mention, however, that at this stage of the exposition the good is still something formal—there are no specific grounds or norms, by which the content of the good can be identified.[5] The subjective will is not from the very beginning in accordance with the good, but it relates to the good as to something that ought to be realized, and this only by means of the individual will’s commitment.[6]
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| Caspar David Friedrich, Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer, 1818 |
[1] G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Werke, vol. 7, E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel
(eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 25; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, tr. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 20.
[2] Hegel, Grundlinien, 26; Elements, 21.
[3] Hegel Grundlinien, 15; Elements, 12.
[4] Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H. G. Hotho 1822-23, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1974, § 130, 409.
[5] Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts, 1822-23, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2005, § 129, 128.
[6] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 131, 244; Elements, 158.
