Subjectivity and vanity in Hegel's philosophy (Part 2)

Conscience in relation to objectivity

If subjectivity relates to the good (das Gute) as to something that ought to be realized, then this relation entails the right of subjectivity to recognize as valid only what it perceives as good and rational.[1] Accordingly, a certain type of accountability on the part of the subject is involved; a moral agent accounts for an action only insofar they are aware of the value this action has in objectivity.[2] The good itself remains still formal and empty, raising the question of whether subjective insight into the good is valid or not. 

Subjective insight vs. "the right of the rational"

On one hand, the good is essential to moral agency to the extent that it unifies the abstract elements of right and welfare, thus constituting a higher sphere of freedom—a sphere where the particular will aligns with universality.[3] Subjectivity can be held accountable for an action only insofar she knowns of it and she recognizes it as essential for its conduct.[4] Therefore, the subject has a right to know what the good consists of—the good should not be something alien to subjectivity.[5] On the other hand, subjective cognizance of the value of an action—whether it is right or wrong, good or evil, legal or illegal—may collide with what Hegel calls “the right of the rational as the objective”[6]; precisely on the grounds of the formality of the good, “insight” into the good “is equally capable of being true and of being mere opinion and error” [7].

Submitting oneself to the right of objectivity

From the perspective of abstract morality, insight into the good remains a matter of subjective education (Bildung)[8]—the right to know what is good does not specify what kind of knowledge this entails, but rather suggests that its sole source is the particular standpoint of the subject.[9]

Here, Hegel underlines an important distinction between the right of insight into the good and the right of insight regarding the action itself: the good remains something abstract and its subjective cognizance is thus formal, i.e. dependent on subjectivity; however, responsibility for an action can only be measured according to objectivity and its laws. That’s why subjective evaluations of an action based on mere conviction (Überzeugung) cannot in any way compromise the right of objectivity (Recht der Objektivität): “[w]hoever wills an action in the actual world has, in so doing, submitted himself to its laws and recognized the right of objectivity”[10].

Convictions may clash with external authorities 

A clear example of such submission to the right of objectivity is found in the context of legal responsibility (gerichtliche Zurechnung): insofar as a subject is also a member of a state, then insight into the good is distinct from the type of insight required from the objective field (objektives Feld) of the law; here insight is valid only as “insight into legality or illegality, i.e. into what is recognized as right”[11].

Hegel thus delineates a line between subjective considerations of what is right or wrong, good or evil, and the cognizance of what is legal and for that reason obligatory. With regard to strict right, that is, to what is externally or compulsorily regulated—Hegel speaks of a Zwangsrecht—, subjectivity retains only the right to know what this right consists of, regardless of whether conscience recognizes these determinations as good or evil.[12] While a subject may insist on knowing whether the determinations of formal right are indeed in and for themselves good, this remains only an inwardly established demand.[13] Conviction which is based solely on subjective grounds, that is, on the authority of a particular subject, is always in opposition to another (external) authority,[14] e.g. the state or even the world—an enormous authority (ungeheure Autorität), as Hegel notes.[15]

La Mort de Socrate (David)

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[1] See G.W.F.Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Werke vol. 7, E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel (eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, § 132 and Anmerkung, 245; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, tr. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 159. Cf. Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts (1821/22), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2005, § 131, 129.

[2] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 132, 245; Elements, 158. Cf. Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 132, 129. 

[3] See Hegel, Grundlinien, § 129, 243; Elements, 157; Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H. G. Hotho 1822/23, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1974, § 129, 407.

[4] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 132, 412–413.

[5] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 137, 134.

[6] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 132 Anmerkung, 245; Elements, 159.

[7] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 132 Anmerkung, 245; Elements, 159.

[8] See Hegel, Grundlinien, § 132 Anmerkung, 246; Elements, 159.

[9] See Hegel, Die „Rechtsphilosophie“ von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen 1821–1825 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1974), § 132, 474–475.

[10] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 132 Anmerkung, 246; Elements, 159.

[11] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 132 Anmerkung, 246; Elements, 159.                

[12] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 132, 414.

[13] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 132, 415.

[14] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 132, 413.

[15] See Hegel, Die „Rechtsphilosophie“ von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen 1821–1825, § 132, 471. Cf. Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 132, 131.

Subjectivity and vanity in Hegel's philosophy (Part 1)

 Moral agency and the notion of the good

In his prefatory remarks of Rechtsphilosophie, Hegel scorns subjective considerations based on mere convictions or feelings and associates them with vanity (Eitelkeit); vanity displays unjustified claims on the part of subjectivity, which purports to possess a spirit of superior knowledge in relation to the present (Gegenwart). When a philosophy attempts to spring over its time, thus constructing a world as it ought to be, the theories produced through such an undertaking would exist only in the pretentious endeavors of opinion—“a pliant medium in which the imagination can construct anything it pleases”.^[1] Hegel’s counter-argument is well known: the sole purpose of his treatise is “to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity”.^[2]  

Inwardness and objectivity 

With this in mind, I will attempt to inquire into Hegel’s accounts of vanity in the chapter on “Morality". This could contribute to the understanding of his more general—and by all means philosophical—stance as expressed in the preface of Rechtsphilosophie; it is where vanity relates to a widespread attitude of his time – namely, the hostility towards what is publicly and universally valid.

In the case of the preface, the critique of vanity concerns, more generally, the faultfinding that inwardness (Innerlichkeit) and opinion (Meinen) adopt towards what is universally and objectively valid as well as a tendency to deviate “from what is universally acknowledged and valid”.^[3]  I believe that an analogous line of argumentation can be identified in the context of Hegel’s critical examination of abstract morality, and particularly in his discussion of conscience (Gewissen). 

Henceforth, and in the next parts of this analysis, I will argue for such a link, first by presenting what conscience is and then by explicating subjective vanity and its, in a way, overly critical stance in reference to objectivity.

A new aspect of morality

In the second part of Rechtsphilosophie, entitled “Morality” (Moralität), vanity appears as a consequence of the limited and abstract standpoint of subjective conscience regarding what is right or wrong, legal or illegal. During the explication of subjective freedom seen as satisfaction of particular interests, the argumentation reaches a turning point, where cases of extreme danger and necessity (Not) give rise to a conflict between one-sided approaches: on the one hand, the rigorous implementation of the law, and on the other, the right to personal welfare, both of which appear equally justified. 

The solution to this opposition constitutes a new aspect of morality, the good (das Gute), which unifies abstract right with the subjective will; thus, the particular aims of subjectivity are legitimized through the good. In fact, both (abstract) right and welfare are “moments of the good”,^[4] and the aforementioned one-sided viewpoints are superseded, as the particular (das Besondere) retains its right within the universal. 

It's important to mention, however, that at this stage of the exposition the good is still something formal—there are no specific grounds or norms, by which the content of the good can be identified.^[5] The subjective will is not from the very beginning in accordance with the good, but it relates to the good as to something that ought to be realized, and this only by means of the individual will’s commitment.^[6]

Caspar David Friedrich, Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer, 1818

[1] G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Werke, vol. 7, E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel (eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 25; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, tr. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 20. 

[2] Hegel, Grundlinien, 26; Elements, 21.

[3] Hegel Grundlinien, 15; Elements, 12.

[4] Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H. G. Hotho 1822-23, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1974, § 130, 409.

[5] Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts, 1822-23, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2005, § 129, 128.

[6] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 131, 244; Elements, 158.