Pathologies of moral subjectivism
Without any objective system of duties and rights arbitrary subjectivity remains the only principle available to determine the content of the good. It is especially "hairsplitting reflection" (spitzfindige Reflexion) that places extreme emphasis on exceptional situations, for example when duties collide, perhaps in order to untie itself from rights and duties altogether.[1] But exceptional situations that come about only seldom in reality cannot totally expunge universal principles and duties,[2] under which particular cases are to be subsumed[3]—nevertheless, “[m]en often say, their conscience advised them this or that, in order to evade a reproach”[4].
Groundless and conscientious actions
If formal conscience were to make a final decision regarding a collision between duties, such a decision would eventually be groundless,[5] since “[a] ground should be something objective, universal”[6], therefore independent of conviction, which is contingent and encumbered with the possibility of error; without education (Bildung) or discipline (Zucht) of the particular will, one could argue about anything on the basis of such subjective grounds.[7] On the other hand, it is through discipline that the subject is expected to relinquish its particular authority with regard to the authority, say, of the state, which is a more universal authority,[8] and act in favour of a higher—not self-made, but solid and objectively recognized—duty;[9] “a conscientious person is one who does her duties, not one who first makes them”[10].
Forming a separate idea of the good
We may ask ourselves: Why is such a formal and one-sided conscience that discards objectivity[11] deemed problematic? Hegel’s handwritten notes to Rechtsphilosophie provide significant insight into the matter: beyond the finite horizon of the—allegedly absolute—formal conscience are other subjects, with their respective expectations and particular ends—a whole society even.
If people were to conform their actions solely to what resides in their particular conscience, that is, distinct from principles of right or even opposed to what is objectively recognized as right and ethical (sittlich), then no assurance (Versicherung) or trust (Zutrauen) that their actions are seriously meant could be provided:[12] “If everything were left to the decision of conscience, then objectivity would dissolve”.[13] Lacking in content, subjectivity would then come to decide by itself what is obligatory based on the satisfaction of its own conviction and good reasons (aus guten Gründen),[14] thus forming its separate idea of the good.[15]
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| Jean-Georges Vibert, The committee on moral books, 1866 |
[1] See Hegel, Die „Rechtsphilosophie“ von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen 1821–1825, § 137, 485. [My own translation]. Cf. Die Philosophie des Rechts (1821/22), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2005, § 137, 134.
[2] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 137, 134.
[3] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H. G. Hotho 1822/23, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1974, § 137, 428.
[4] Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 137, 133. [My own translation].
[5] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817/18) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19), § 62A, 83.
[6] Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 132, 130.
[7] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 132, 130–131.
[8] See Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 132, 131.
[9] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 137, 133. Cf. Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 13, 134.
[10] Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 137, 133. Cf. Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 137, 428. [My own translation]
[11] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 137, 136.
[12] See Hegel, Die „Rechtsphilosophie“ von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen 1821–1825, § 137, 487. Cf. Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, §140, 142.
[13] Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817/18) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19), § 70 Anmerkung, 246. [My own translation]
[14] See Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Werke vol. 7, E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel (eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, § 132 Anmerkung, 246; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, tr. by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 159.
[15] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 132, 130. Cf. Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von K. G. v. Griesheims 1824/25 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1974), § 137, 363.
