Subjectivity and vanity in Hegel's philosophy (Part 4)

 True and formal conscience

A certain difference between subjective cognizance of the value of an action and objectivity has been made apparent in Hegel's account of morality, and develops further as follows: 

• When conscience acts according to objective determinations and obligations—which only ethical life (Sittlichkeit) can provide to subjective knowledge—it is thus called true conscience (wahrhaftes Gewissen). True conscience consists in “the disposition to will what is good in and for itself”[1] and acts according to objective duties,[2] insofar as it relinquishes the possibility of determining the particular content of the good itself.[3]
  
  
• If the actions of conscience do not conform to any fixed principles (feste Grundsätze), conscience retains only “the formal aspect of the activity of the will”[4]. Within the standpoint of morality the only available content for conscience to adopt appears to be “the infinite formal certainty of itself”[5].

Universality contra self-certainty

Obviously, this content may or may not be in accordance with what is “truly right and duty”[6]. As Hegel mentions, “rationality in and for itself”[7] is not to be treated as equivalent to what a certain individual holds to be right and true; in fact, the content of this supposed good (Gutseinsollenden) must be compared with “universal determinations of thought” that take “the form of laws and principles”[8]. 

On the contrary, formal conscience improperly presumes that its self-certainty and inwardness constitute the only guiding principle to determine the good and evaluate its actions—as if such an arbitrary positing of the good were isolated from objective determinations.[9] Of course, this once more indicates a stance of total divergence of the subject from what is acknowledged as objectively and universally valid.

The limits of moral standpoint

To the degree that conscience holds fast to this one-sided (moral) standpoint, the state cannot recognize it as valid “any more than science can grant any validity to subjective opinion, assertion and the appeal to subjective opinion”[10]. Conscience is entitled to know what the good in and for itself is, and thus to acknowledge as obligatory only what it cognizes as the good, provided that this cognizance aligns with what is truly right and rational—this takes the form of universal determinations based on thought. But conscience is not entitled to posit itself the content of the good, unless it clings on to its self-certainty and subjective opinion.[11]

 

Franz Marc - Kämpfende Formen, 1914

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[1] Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Werke vol. 7, E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel (eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp § 137, 254; Elements, 164.

[2] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817/18) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19), § 66 Anmerkung, 87. Cf. Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H. G. Hotho 1822/23, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1974, § 137, 427–428.

[3] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts  (1821/22), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2005, § 137, 133.

[4] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137, 254; Elements, 164.       

[5] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137, 255; Elements, 164.

[6] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137 Anmerkung, 255; Elements, 164.

[7] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137 Anmerkung, 255; Elements, 164. 

[8] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137 Anmerkung, 255; Elements, 164–165. Cf. Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von K. G. v. Griesheims 1824/25 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1974), § 137, 362.

[9] See Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 137, 132.

[10] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137 Anmerkung, 255; Elements, 165.

[11] See Hegel, Grundlinien, § 137 Anmerkung, 256; Elements, 165. Cf. Die Philosophie des Rechts 1821/22, § 132, 129–130.

Subjectivity and vanity in Hegel's philosophy (Part 3)

The sole determining factor

From what we've seen so far in Hegel's account of conscience, there is a certain amount of contingency as to what is to be recognized as good by subjective conscience. All the same, the good is supposed to be something universal, in which such contingency and formality—or emptiness—vanish.[1] As for the evaluation of an action regarding legal imputation, public laws and universal customs (die allgemeinen Sitten) constitute the only guiding principles.[2]

What is duty?

Nevertheless, these determinations are, at this point of the argumentation, absent—we are still observing the “merely moral point of view”[3]. The good itself may be regarded as an obligation (Verpflichtung) in relation to the subjective will,[4] but an exact account of what is to be considered as duty (Pflicht) has yet to emerge;[5] Hegel argues that particular determinations such as right and welfare are too restricting, and thus considerations regarding duty are directed “to the higher sphere of the unconditional”[6].  

Banishing hot air

Insofar as the good remains abstract and groundless, then “the absolute inward certainty of itself”[7]—or conscience—remains the sole determining factor or absolute authority regarding the particular content of the good, and hence of duty. Yet, empty talk about duty, the unconditional or universality makes us weary of its abstraction and incites us to search for its determinate content.[8] What happens in absence of such content?

The noble standpoint

Then a…content creator emerges: subjectivity, which is hence directed toward the “deepest inward loneliness with itself”[9]. This direction signifies a noble standpoint (hohe Standpunkt), since the subject can unbind itself from any particular ends.[10] Hegel even attributes to it a certain degree of majesty, inasmuch as it demonstrates and raises itself above finitude.[11] However, this detachment from particularity leads the self-relating subject to connect her inner cognizance of itself as thinking (Denken) with what should count as moraly obligatory for the will.[12]

Succinctly put: “[B]efore conscience nothing counts as right and duty, no existence is valid”[13]. 

Franz Marc, Der Tiger, 1912

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[1] See Hegel, Die „Rechtsphilosophie“ von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen 1821–1825, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1974, § 132, 471.

[2] See Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Werke vol. 7, E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel (eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, § 132 Anmerkung, 246; Elements, 159–160.

[3] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 135 Anmerkung, 252; Elements, 162.

[4] See Hegel, Grundlinien, § 133, 250; Elements, 161.

[5] See Hegel, Grundlinien, § 134, 251; Elements, 161.

[6] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 135, 252; Elements, 162.

[7] Hegel, Grundlinien, § 136, 254; Elements, 163.

[8] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift von H. G. Hotho 1822/23, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1974, § 136, 425.

[9] Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 136, 426.

[10] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 136, 426.

[11] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 138, 432.

[12] See Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts 1822/23, § 136, 426–427.

[13] See Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817/18) und Homeyer (Berlin 1818/19), Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1983, § 66 Anmerkung, 86–87.